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ABSTRACT
Post-merger appraisal rights have been the focus of heated controversy within mergers and acquisitions circles in recent years.
Traditionally perceived as an arcane and cabalistic proceeding, the
appraisal action has recently come to occupy center stage through
the ascendancy of appraisal arbitrage—whereby investors purchase
target-company shares shortly after an announcement principally
to pursue appraisal. Such strategies became more feasible and
profitable a decade ago, on the heels of two seemingly technocratic
reforms in Delaware: (i) the statutory codification of pre-judgment
interest, pegging a presumptive rate at five percent above the
federal discount rate; and (ii) the Transkaryotic opinion, which
effectively sanctified appraisal claims trading. Several commentators have decried appraisal arbitrage as visiting unnecessary risks
and costs on deal certainty and pricing, advancing the position
that it reduces/destroys target shareholder value. This paper interrogates such claims both theoretically and empirically, testing
the predictions of an auction-design model that delivers testable
implications about appraisal’s price and welfare implications. We
find—consistent with the comparative statics of our model—that
the appraisal-liberalizing events of 2007 were associated with a
significant increase in deal premia, as the enhanced credibility of
appraisal had the effect of raising the de facto “reserve price” associated with M&A auctions. We further find little evidence that liberalized appraisal rights stifled the incidence of appraisal eligible deals.
Moreover, when interpreted through the lens of our auction-design
model, our findings suggest that target-company shareholders of
all stripes likely benefited ex ante from liberalized appraisal.
∗ We thank John Armour, Adam Badawi, Bobby Bartlett, Bernard Black, Brian Broughman, Joshua Mitts, Gabriel Rauterberg, Sarath Songa, Ge Wu, and seminar participants
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Introduction

In mergers and acquisitions (M&A) law, the outcome of deal litigation often
hinges critically on the content and discharge of the fiduciary duties owed by
target-company officers, directors and dominant shareholders. This obsession
is no doubt warranted: Fiduciary conflicts can prove to be most consequential
at the Rubicon of a sale—often the endgame for target-company shareholders.
Accordingly, for the good part of the last half-century, Delaware courts have
singled out such circumstances for special attention in developing the state’s
fiduciary common law, imposing heightened scrutiny on decision making in the
M&A context, and spotlighting “the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and
its shareholders.” (Unocal v. Mesa (1985); Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes
(1986)). The topic is easily one of the most celebrated and written-about areas
of company law.
Far from the limelight of fiduciary duties, a vestigial fossil from a bygone
M&A era has reclusively lurked, awaiting its Norma Desmond close-up1 : The
statutory appraisal right. The appraisal proceeding affords target-company
shareholders the option of eschewing the terms of an acquisition in favor of
receiving a judicially determined cash valuation for their shares. All states have
long provided this statutory option in some form or another for many—but not
all—transactions. Its roots trace to the mid-19th century, and it first became
available in Delaware in its modern form in the early part of the 20th century
(Eisenberg, 1976).
In appraisal-eligible cases,2 dissenting shareholders hold a potentially powerful tool to counter deal terms they believe to be inadequate or undercompensatory. When sought by an eligible shareholder, appraisal obliges a
court to “determine the fair value of the shares” of the target corporation,
“tak[ing] into account all relevant factors” and with no explicit assignment of
the burden of proof. 8 Del. C. §262(h). Beginning in the early 1980s, this
task of fair valuation in appraisal began increasingly to be based on modern
tools of financial valuation, including discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and
comparable company benchmarking. Modern appraisal cases invariably entail
prolix valuation reports by competing experts whose fair value estimates can
at London Business School, Northwestern, and the 2018 BYU Winter Deals Conference in
Park City for helpful comments and suggestions. Palia thanks the Center for Contract and
Economic Organization at Columbia Law for partial financial support.
1 Sunset Boulevard, Closing Scene E-47 (1950) (https://youtu.be/jMTT0LW0M_Y).
2 Eligible public-target transactions under the Delaware statute are generally limited
to statutory mergers that involve either a mandatory cash component or a squeeze out of
minority shareholders. In addition, shareholders seeking the remedy must “perfect” their
eligibility in several ways (including not voting their shares in favor of the transaction). See
8 Del. C. §262(h).
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differ multifold. By most accounts, non-financially-trained judges find such
procedures challenging at best (Talley, 2017; Choi and Talley, 2017).
It was not until 2007, however, that appraisal rights finally received their
Desmondian due, courtesy of two significant legal events that afforded the
statutory proceeding a spotlight of its own. First, in August of 2007, §262(h) of
the Delaware code was amended to award presumptive pre-judgment interest
in appraisal proceedings pegged at the Federal Reserve discount rate plus five
percent (5%), compounded quarterly. (Although the statute allows the court to
impose a different rate in exercising its equitable discretion, the overwhelming
practice since the amendment has been simply to award the statutory spread.)
Coming in an era of notable narrowing in spreads and reduced opportunity cost
of capital, the statutory pre-judgment rate typically rendered an investment in
a post-closing appraisal action against a credit-worthy acquirer to be among
the highest yielding investments available (Jetly and Ji, 2016).
Second, in May of 2007 an important Delaware case substantially liberalized
eligibility of a shareholder both to aggregate claims through share purchases
and to perfect a right to appraisal. In In re: Appraisal of Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc. (2007), Chancellor William Chandler held that a beneficial
owner of stock in a public target who buys after the “record date” of merger (a)
remains eligible to assert appraisal rights; and (b) need not prove continued
eligibility by tracing how the votes that were associated with her newly acquired
shares were cast in the shareholder proxy election.3 In effect, Transkaryotic
sanctified and legitimized a potential market for claims trading and aggregation
in appraisal actions.
Although both the statutory amendment to §262 and the Transkaryotic
opinion were motivated almost solely by pragmatic considerations, they (perhaps unwittingly) opened the door to an arbitrage opportunity for outside
hedge funds: For it now became possible to accumulate shares in the target
company after an announced merger, perfect appraisal rights, and put forward
a sophisticated expert to challenge the merger consideration, possibly obtaining
an award in excess of the merger consideration. And, even if the award fell
short of the merger consideration, it would accrue interest at the statutory
compounded rate, often far outpacing the risk-adjusted return on the deal
consideration itself.
The growth in “appraisal arbitrage” that ensued in the years since has
attracted much attention, and contending with appraisal risk has (purportedly)
become a critical consideration in designing, pricing, and even pursuing an
otherwise eligible transaction. The rationale usually advanced by critics is
that appraisal risk hurts target shareholders by depressing deal prices and
frequencies, and that reintroducing (pre-2007-like) limits on the appraisal right
3 Under the formal rules of the statute (8 Del. C. §262(h)), if a share were voted in favor
of a proposed deal, that share would lose eligibility to seek post-closing appraisal rights.
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would ultimately inure to shareholders’ ex ante benefit. (See Hamermesh and
Wachter, 2017, reviewing literature). Resistance to appraisal arbitrage has
also attracted judicial attention, culminating in two recent Delaware Supreme
Court opinions that have substantially undercut the value of seeking appraisal
by inducing trial courts to place greater emphasis on the deal price and pre-deal
market price (and less relative emphasis on DCF) when valuing shares. (Dell
v. Magnetar (2017); DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners
(2017)).
This paper considers the question of whether the 2007 reforms had the
negative repercussions that critics lament, both from theoretical and empirical
perspectives. Theoretically, we extend the auction-design framework developed
in Choi and Talley (2017) to derive a series of comparative statics related to
observable factors concerning M&A transactions and target shareholder welfare.
Using this model, we demonstrate that a credible threat of an appraisal action
can sometimes constitute a valuable vehicle for augmenting shareholder value,
whereby the specter of later appraisal value acts as a credible type of “reserve
price” in a company auction. So long as the anticipated appraisal value remains
(weakly) below the expected-revenue-maximizing reserve price in a company
auction (and the appraisal statute all but compels it to do so), appraisal always
weakly benefits shareholders in the aggregate. At the same time, the gains
from appraisal need not be distributed evenly, and there may exist equilibria
where appraisal’s benefits inure solely to shareholders who dissent strategically
from otherwise good deals in order to seek additional consideration through
appraisal (giving the shorter end of the stick to shareholders who must carry the
vote and cannot seek appraisal). And, irrespective of distributional concerns,
if the anticipated appraisal right grows “too large” it can reduce aggregate
target shareholder welfare (by imposing a prohibitive reserve price on an
auction, stifling value-enhancing bids). More significantly, our model delivers
testable empirical predictions relating to how “shocks” to the appraisal remedy
affect expected shareholder value. In particular, we show that under plausible
assumptions as to the status quo ante, a liberalizing shock to appraisal will
lead to enhanced target shareholder welfare if it is accompanied by an increase
in expected merger premia for appraisal eligible deals.4
We then test this (and related) predictions empirically using the 2007
reforms as an appraisal-liberalizing shock. First, we demonstrate (consistent
with our model) that deal premia are discernibly higher in appraisal eligible
transactions (even when one accounts for the tax status of the deal). Second,
we use a difference-in-differences specification to consider the combined effects
of the 2007 shocks (Transkaryotic and the amendment of DGCL 262(h)) on
deal premia for appraisal-eligible acquisition (using appraisal-ineligible deals as
4 Formally, this condition also requires the assumption that under the status quo ante,
courts faithfully execute their statutory mandate (even approximately) to award fair value
exclusive of deal synergies. See Corollary 4, infra.
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a control). We find consistent evidence that the liberalizing 2007 shocks were
followed by significant increases in premia associated with appraisal eligible
deals relative to the control group. Third, we do a number of tests to confirm
the robustness of these results. Specifically, we confirm that are results are not
affected by: a trend in the difference between appraisal eligible transactions
and non-appraisal eligible transactions before the event date (i.e., parallel trend
violations), alternative plausible event dates in 2007, and controls for the tax
status of the deal. And finally, we show that the 2007 shocks were associated
with a statistically insignificant effect on the incidence of appraisal-eligible
deals relative to the control group. All told, our empirical results suggest that
the 2007 reforms (and the appraisal arbitrage they ushered in) were beneficial
to target shareholder value.
Our contribution fits into a small but growing literature on appraisal remedies and their effects on the takeover market. As noted above, Choi and Talley
(2017) develop a theoretical auction model (which we extend here), combining
managerial agency costs, shareholder voting, and the appraisal remedy to study
how and when appraisal contributes to expected shareholder welfare. They find
that it does contribute under a variety of plausible conditions, and thus that
current calls for courts simply to use the “merger price” in appraisal actions
should be embraced only in special situations (and with considerable caution).
Their analysis does not, however, attend to the comparative statics we derive
and test below. Mahoney and Weinstein (1999) compare merger premia in
appraisal-eligible and appraisal-ineligible cases, finding little evidence that
appraisal eligibility predicts different premia – a finding that is inconsistent
with our (but predates many of the dynamics explored here). Jiang et al.
(2016) investigate the appraisal remedy and show that appraisal is more likely
to be exercised when there is a perception of conflicts-of-interest and when the
premium offered is low, a result that is consistent with our theoretical findings.
Our paper is perhaps most closely related to contemporaneous work by
Boone et al. (2017) (“BBM”) who also explore the effects of the 2007 shocks
(along with other smaller events) on appraisal premia. Their paper generates
results that appear fully consistent with ours, albeit with a different empirical strategy. A few differences worthy of highlighting between our approach
and theirs are as follows: First, our analysis motivates the empirical analysis through a theoretical auction-design framework, deriving comparative
statics that we then subject to testing. BBM’s conceptual approach is more
informal/inductive (though they do root some of their analysis in the insights
from Choi and Talley (2017)). Second, while we use appraisal ineligible deals
as a control within Delaware-target transactions, BBM treat all Delaware
public targets as the treatment group and all non-Delaware targets as the
control (regardless of appraisal eligibility). Relatedly, our approach requires
us to confirmed by hand whether the deal qualifies for appraisal or not under
Delaware law, whereas BBM does not engage with appraisal eligibility. Fourth,
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while BBM focuses on gross unadjusted premia and abnormal announcement
returns, we focus on logged gross premia, a design decision we justify in light
of the skewed nature of the data. Finally, unlike BBM, we conduct robustness
checks on our results related to the tax status of a deal, since most appraisaleligible deals are taxable (and that taxable deals tend to garner higher deal
premia). All that said, we view the two papers to be highly complementary
and ultimately symbiotic robustness checks against one another.
Two caveats to our analysis bear emphasis before proceeding. First, the
finding that appraisal liberalization appears to have enhanced bid premia satisfies an important diagnostic condition for the 2007 shocks to have enhanced
shareholder welfare as well. Standing alone, however, it is not sufficient. For
example, if appraisal remedies were already “too generous” (in a manner to
be formalized below), further liberalization of appraisal could well (i) cause
premia to increase; but (ii) unambiguously harm incumbent shareholder value
by chilling too many deals. We address this issue both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, we note that the Delaware appraisal statute specifically
requires courts to focus on going-concern value, excluding synergies realized
solely from the merger. If courts faithfully discharged this mandate (even
approximately), we show that an increase in premia induced by liberalization
of appraisal rights would then be sufficient to conclude shareholder welfare also
increased. Empirically, we conduct an additional robustness test on whether
deal intensity of appraisal-eligible deals declined after the 2007 shocks relative to the control group, finding no economically or statistically significant
differences—consistent with modest chilling effects.
The second caveat relates to our identification strategy. By using appraisal
ineligible cases as a control, we implicitly require that it is difficult for a
deal structure to cross the eligibility boundary endogenously. In some cases,
that presumption is easily warranted when first order concerns dictate deal
structure. (For example, a going-private acquisition of a public firm with
non-assignable assets virtually requires that the transaction be eligible for
appraisal.) In contrast, a strategic stock-for-stock acquisition by another public
company makes it relatively easy to avoid appraisal (and most do). That
said, we acknowledge that there can be some slippage between eligible and
ineligible deals, and that deals that might have weathered the risk of appraisal
prior to 2007 would choose a non-eligible structure afterwards (or vice versa).
Although we conjecture that this slippage would principally act to attenuate
our results (thus working in our favor), we cannot rule out other potential
effects of endogeneity bias either.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section II develops a theoretical model
extending the analysis of Choi and Talley (2017) to derive comparative statics
plausibly associated with the 2007 shocks. Section III explains how we created
our sample and describes our data and variables. Our empirical tests and
results are reported in Section IV. Section V briefly concludes.
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Model

This section develops a set of theoretical hypotheses about the plausible effects
the 2007 appraisal liberalization on merger prices and shareholder welfare. Our
analysis builds on the appraisal-auction design framework developed elsewhere
Choi and Talley (2017). We extend that framework here to develop several
comparative statics predictions that we take to the data in the next section.
Consider a potential sale of a corporate entity (“target”) involving three
groups of strategic, risk-neutral players:
• Incumbent target shareholders of the target;
• An agent (or “manager”) of the firm; and
• A group of potential buyers.
There are four relevant periods (t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}) and no time discounting. At
t = 0, corporate governance and dissenters’ rights are fixed, and the agent
establishes a sale process. At t = 1, bidders privately observe their respective
valuations of the target and bid on the company in pursuant to the established
auction protocol. At t = 2, incumbent shareholders vote whether to accept the
winning bid. Should a sufficient majority vote in favor, the transaction closes,
all shareholders (including dissenters) relinquish their shares, with assenting
shareholders receive pro rata shares of the winning bid as consideration.5
At t = 3, dissenting shareholders choose between (a) accepting the merger
consideration, and (b) receiving a judicially determined “fair value” through
an appraisal proceeding. We flesh out each of these details below.
Consider first the target. We assume the target has a single class of
fully-distributed voting stock, held by a countably large, diffuse group of
2T + 1 incumbent shareholders (with T ∈ N and T  0), each owning a
single share of the company. For expositional convenience, and following
Choi and Talley (2017), we invoke the notation of a limiting case where
shareholder population converges to a continuum with mass 1, each holding
a dγ ≈ 2T1+1 fractional ownership share of the company. Each shareholder
places a differential valuation on the firm as a going concern, indexed through
her type γ ∈ [v, v̄] ⊆ [0, ∞), representing the shareholder’s willingness to
accept. Differential willingness to accept among shareholders is common, and
may be due to myriad factors (such as distinct tax bases, portfolio positions,
liquidity preferences, non-convergent beliefs, differential time horizons and
so forth). Shareholder type γ values her fractional ownership stake at γ ·
dγ, and thus implicitly values the entire firm at γ. Shareholder types are
5 Since—unlike tender offers—dissenters must relinquish their shares, holdouts (a la
Grossman & Hart 1980) are not as problematic in our model. We assume a single-step
transaction for cash, but both assumptions are easily relaxed.
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distributed according to a commonly-known cumulative distribution function
H(γ) : [v, v̄] → [0, 1], with a continuously differentiable density function
h(γ) > 0 ∀ γ ∈ [v, v̄].6
Shareholders’ differential willingness to accept naturally causes disagreement about the relative attractiveness of a takeover bid. To appreciate the
effects of this disagreement in what follows, it will help to distinguish between
three distinct shareholder types. First, consider the marginal shareholder,
whose willingness to accept is lowest among all existing shareholders (γ = v)
and is thus the most willing to sell. The marginal shareholder is also functionally the pre-deal market price maker, since her value reflects the market
clearing asking price for shares in the absence of a material prospect of a
merger.7
Second, consider the representative shareholder, which we define as the one
whose valuation of the firm is equal to the mean across all target shareholders.
Aggregating thusly on [v, v̄], the representative/mean shareholder’s willingness
to accept is:
Z
v̄

γh (γ) dγ ∈ (v, v̄)

µ = E (γ) ≡

(1)

v

Note that the value of µ is also a focal point for the appraisal remedy, since
most appraisal statutes (Delaware’s included) direct the court to deliver an
assessment calibrated to the target shareholders’ overall “going concern” value
of the target, one that excludes any additional synergies associated with the
merger itself. A natural interpretation of this mandate is that fair value should
be pegged to the representative shareholder’s willingness to accept. (For now,
however, we will consider a more general case below, where the expected
appraisal value is given by φ > 0, which may or may not be equal to µ).8
Third, let ρ ∈ (v, v̄) denote the pivotal shareholder, who provides the swing
vote in approving a merger. The pivotal shareholder’s identity turns on the
threshold mandate needed by law/doctrine to approve the merger, which we
will denote by the parameter α ∈ [1/2, 1). In many cases, the required mandate
will map directly onto shareholders’ valuations: conditional on an offered price
b, for example, all shareholders with γ ≤ b would support selling at that price
6 A special case of this framework involves identically-valuing shareholders, so that v = v̄.
The assumption of differential shareholder valuations is intuitive and familiar. See, e.g., Stulz
(1988) (tax basis differences among shareholders generating different reservation values); and
Brunnermeier et al. (2014) (players holding divergent beliefs that are common knowledge
but do not converge).
7 This is true since if the market price were higher than any shareholder’s reservation
value, that shareholder would have sold her shares to the market rather than remaining as a
shareholder.
8 It is important to note that setting appraisal equal to the representative shareholder’s
value need not coincide with—and tends to diverge from—an optimal value for fair market
appraisal. While not addressed here, the task of calibrating an optimal appraisal value is
taken up at length in Choi and Talley (2017).
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while shareholders with γ > b oppose the sale. So long as shareholders cast
their votes non-strategically (a condition we interrogate below), obtaining
shareholder approval requires offering a sufficiently high price b such that
H(b) ≥ α. Consequently, under sincere voting the shareholder with valuation
ρ satisfying the condition α = H(ρ) is the unique pivotal shareholder.9 Our
framework allows the approval threshold α to be set at any level, but it is
no doubt most natural to highlight the 50% point coinciding with a bare
majority and the median shareholder (α = 1/2).10 Shareholder heterogeneity
implies that the marginal, representative, and pivotal shareholders are generally
distinct (except for special distributional cases), and that both the representative and pivotal shareholder values lie strictly above that of the marginal
shareholders.
Our model bundles together a variety of individual actors into the “manager”
role, including not only corporate officers and directors, but also a host of
other professionals who work with them to design the auction at t = 0—such
as financial and legal advisers. We assume that the manager’s key role here is
to set a “reserve price” for the auction (rm ≥ 0), which establishes the price
below which the manager will refuse to sell the company.11 The manager’s
behavior may stray from shareholders’ interests in two critical respects. First,
manager has limited independent ability to commit to a reserve price. In
particular, should bidding prove tepid—so that the highest bid falls below the
reserve price—the manager cannot credibly commit to walk away from the high
bid if it increases her own private payoff relative to the status quo. Second,
irrespective of commitment, the manager’s objectives may diverge from those of
target shareholders. And, given the amalgamated composition of the “manager”
player, this divergence can go in multiple directions. Consistent with standard
agency cost intuitions, the manager may be too reluctant to sell the company
(such as when she enjoys private benefits of control from the status quo).
Alternatively, however, the manager may be too eager to sell (such as when she
requires liquidity, or is unduly influenced by outside advisers angling to close
a sale12 ). We capture these incentive problems by assuming that the manager
seeks to maximize the sum of (a) expected aggregate shareholder value, and
(b) a private payoff of M ∈ R realized in the event of a successful sale. The
manager’s objective function is thus given by Πm = Πs + P r(sale) · M , where
9 The assumptions on h(.) guarantee that the relationship mapping from α and ρ is
unique. That said, the pivotal voter need not always be unique with insincere voting.
10 Corporate law typically fixes a default at α = 0.5. See, e.g., DGCL §251(c).
11 There may be other auction-related tasks for the agent, such as recruiting bidders to
participate.
12 See, e.g., RBC Capital Markets v. Jervis (“Rural-Metro”) (2015) (financial advisor
manipulated board into accepting a proposed deal for which it had buy-side financing
prospects); Smith v. Van Gorkom (1985) (retiring CEO sold the target too cheaply and
with inadequate diligence).
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Πs denotes the expected payoff of shareholders.13 When M > 0, the manager
receives a private benefit from sale and is thus “too eager” to sell. When
M < 0, by contrast, the manager enjoys a net private benefit from the status
quo, and is thus “too reluctant.” In the special case of M = 0, the manager’s
incentives are perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests.14 We assume that
M is commonly known by all players.
Finally, we suppose that N ≥ 1 outside bidders participate in the auction.
We assume N to be exogenous at this stage (reserving for an extension
the possibility of recruiting bidders). Each bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , N } costlessly
observes its private valuation of the target, denoted by vi . We consider an
independent private values (IPV) auction, where vi is independently and
identically distributed on support [0, ∞) according to a commonly-known
cumulative distribution function F (v), with continuously differentiable density
function of f (v) > 0 ∀v ∈ [0, ∞). We also make a standard regularity
(v)
assumption that the hazard rate 1−F
f (v) is monotone non-increasing in v.
Because this is an extensive form game with privately informed players
(the buyers and the shareholders), Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is an
appropriate solution concept, and we employ it throughout in what follows
(calling it simply an “equilibrium”). The equilibrium and the optimal strategies
for a generic auction of this type are well known in the literature: for each
buyer, the dominant strategy is to stay in the auction until the bid surpasses
his valuation vi .15 The probability of a sale for N ≥ 1 number of bidders and
N
reserve price r ≥ 0, therefore, is given by Pr {Sale | N, r} = 1 − F (r) . An
issue animating much of our discussion concerns the “optimal” reserve price
r∗ ∈ [v, v̄], which we define as that which maximizes the shareholders’ expected
payoff. A well-known result from the literature on generic IPV auctions is
that when the seller’s valuation is equal to µ the optimal reserve price is
independent of N and is given by:
r∗ = µ +

1 − F (r∗ )
f (r∗ )

(2)

13 To avoid circularity, we omit from Π any components of shareholder payoff due
s
to appraisal remedies. At the cost of additional notation, this framework can easily be
generalized to Πm = β · Πs + P r(sale) · M where β ∈ (0, 1). Qualitative results of the paper
will not change.
14 Although it is often intuitive to assume managers categorically have net private benefits
of control under the status quo (so that M < 0), the opposite can easily hold in our
framework too. For example, a variety of golden-parachute can skew directors’ and officers’
incentives towards sale. More significantly, because our definition of “manager” amalgamates
the interests of officers, directors, financial advisers, legal advisers, providers of finance, etc.
under a single banner, a pro-sale skew becomes particularly unsurprising. In any event, we
demonstrate below that commitment constraints alone can generate our main result, even
when the manager enjoys moderate private benefits of control under the status quo.
15 See Myerson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Ausubel and Cramton (2004).
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Note that r∗ ∈ (µ, v̄) so that shareholders would optimally set a reserve price
exceeding their average valuation.16 If shareholders could choose (and commit
to) their own reserve price, then r∗ would be a logical choice.
However, at least three factors cause this framework to deviate from the
standard auction model, and most of them are functionally related to reserve
pricing. First, the requirement of a shareholder vote to approve a deal tends
to provide an implicit floor to bidding, at a level that is closely related to
the pivotal voter’s willingness to accept (γ = ρ). Bids that fail to exceed this
threshold generally are not approved in equilibrium (assuming one refines the
set of equilibria to “weakly undominated” voting outcomes17 ).
Second, the appraisal remedy itself may also provide pricing pressure akin
to a reserve price by providing dissenters with an outside option to seek
appraised value (at φ, as discussed above) rather than accepting the winning
bid. The attractiveness of that option turns on its relative value to other
parameters and the ease of seeking appraisal.
Finally, target management can play a role in setting a reserve price
directly in bargaining, the nature of which turns on the manager’s credibility
and incentives. As to credibility, we suppose that the manager cannot credibly
refuse to approve any winning bid that will—if accepted—cause the manager’s
expected payoff to increase above the status quo, and thus she may not be
able to hold out for an aggressive reserve without some external constraint
(see above). Consequently, garnering managerial agreement to the terms of
the merger (subject to the manager’s limited ability to commit) implies that
the agent will privately hold out for a reserve price of:
∗
rm
≡ max {µ − M, 0}

(3)

It is easily confirmed that so long as the manager does not derive benefits
(r ∗ )
that are “too large” from the status quo (M > − 1−F
f (r ∗ ) ), the manager’s reserve
∗
price falls short of the optimal reserve (rm
< r∗ ). And, whenever the managerial team receives a net benefit from a sale relative to the status quo (M ≥ 0),
the manager’s reserve price is even less aggressive than the going-concern value
of the firm (as reflected by the representative shareholder’s value of µ).
Choi and Talley (2017) characterize the equilibria of a target auction
conducted in the shadow of (i) shareholder voting, (ii) dissenters’ appraisal
rights, and (iii) management’s optimal renegotiation-proof bargaining strategy.
These equilibria can deviate from a standard auction set up in several ways –
16 The condition above is closely related to the monopoly pricing problem, where the
seller sets price by balancing the chance of no sale against the hope of a higher winning bid
(Bulow and Klemperer, 1996).
17 This refinement disallows any posited equilibrium strategy σ̂ for any player γ if there
γ
exists an alternative strategy σ̃γ 6= σ̂γ that fares at least as well for player γ across every
possible permutation of opponents’ strategy profiles σ −γ ∈ Σ−γ , and does strictly better
for player γ in at least one such permutation. See Choi and Talley (2017) for details.
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but in particular, bidding need not coincide with truthful revelation (even in
an ascending/Vickrey auction). Rather, the equilibrium in this case depends
on the relative values of the governance and valuation parameters, in a way
encapsulated by the following result:
Proposition 1. The following constitute the pure strategy equilibria of the
∗
target auction given pivotal shareholder type ρ, a managerial reserve price rm
,
and an expected appraisal value φ:
∗
1. When φ < max {rm
, ρ}, all weakly undominated equilibria are revenue
equivalent to that of an ascending auction with a reserve price equal to
∗
r̂ = max {rm
, ρ} Bidders drop out when the prevailing bid equals their
∗
private valuations (vi ). The winning bid is always at least max {rm
, ρ}
and is approved without dissent. No shareholders seek appraisal.
∗
2. When φ ≥ max {rm
, ρ} there are two classes of weakly undominated
equilibria:

(a) In the first, all equilibria are revenue equivalent to an ascending
auction with a reserve price equal to r̂ = φ. Bidders drop out
when the prevailing bid equals their private valuations (vi ). The
winning bid is always at least φ and is approved without dissent. No
shareholders seek appraisal.
(b) In the second, all equilibria are revenue equivalent to an auction
∗
with reserve price equal to max{αρ + (1 − α) φ, rm
}. Bidders drop
out before the prevailing bid reaches their private valuations (vi ).
If the winning bid exceeds φ it is approved without dissent and no
shareholders seek appraisal. Otherwise, the winning bid is approved
by a bare α-fraction of target shareholders, and the remaining (1 − α)
seek appraisal.
Proof. See Choi and Talley (2017) (Proposition 6).18
The gravamen of Proposition 1 is that the outside threat of appraisal (with
expected value of φ) “matters” for bidding outcomes only if it is not eclipsed
by alternative forms of price protection, namely shareholder voting (through
∗
∗
ρ) and credible managerial bargaining (through rm
). When φ < max {rm
, ρ}
(Part 1A of the Proposition), the appraisal option is insufficiently potent to
move the pricing needle, since management’s threat point and/or the required
∗
vote on the deal already ensure that no winning below the larger of rm
and ρ
can pass through the sluice gates. The bid-disciplining effect of appraisal is
18 For purposes of this paper, we confine our analysis to pure strategy equilibria. We note,
however, that Choi and Talley (2017) also demonstrate that when shareholder types are
truly differentiated across shareholders, mixed strategy equilibria generally do not exist.
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thus overshadowed by other factors, and incremental “shocks” to appraisal’s
availability have no effect on prices or shareholder welfare.
When the anticipated appraisal award exceeds the alternative sources of
∗
price protection, however (so that φ ≥ max {rm
, ρ}), equilibrium behavior
changes significantly. In particular, two types of pre-strategy equilibria emerge.
In the first “non-coordinated” equilibrium (Part 1B(1)), shareholders’ are
unable to coordinate their actions, so that all will vote against the transaction
unless the winning bid is at least φ causing φ to become the effective reserve
price for the auction. In the second “coordinated” equilibrium (Part 1B(2)),
shareholders coordinate their voting behavior: Those seeking appraisal must
rely on sufficiently many affirmative voters to approve the deal and make
appraisal possible, and all shareholders voting to approve the merger effectively
become pivotal. Consequently, bidders expect to pay a two-part price consisting
of the winning bid’s “announcement” price (paid to all shareholders) and an
additional appraisal supplement (to the 1 − α fraction of shareholders who
oppose the deal). This expectation, in turn, induces bidders to drop out before
the going bid reaches their private valuations, since they must capitalize the
value of the anticipated supplement through appraisal. Consequently, in this
equilibrium, the winning bid reflects a type of “hold back” of some of the
consideration in order to satisfy appraisal claimants. The end result of this
strategic posturing is that the coordinated equilibrium replicates the aggregate
expected revenues of an ascending auction with de facto reserve price equal to
∗
max{αρ + (1 − α) φ, rm
}, though such revenues are no longer split pro rata
between dissenting shareholders and supporters of the deal.
Choi and Talley (2017) also demonstrate that so long as the alternative
sources of reserve pricing fall short of the revenue-maximizing reserve price
∗
for the auction—so that max {rm
, ρ} < r∗ —there always exists a binding
shareholder-welfare maximizing appraisal value that is unique conditional on
the equilibrium that emerges. (See Choi and Talley, 2017, Proposition 7).
When the uncoordinated equilibrium obtains, this optimal appraisal value is
(r ∗ )
simply r∗ ≡ µ + 1−F
f (r ∗ ) , the familiar optimal reserve price in an independent
values auction. When the coordinated equilibrium obtains, in contrast—where
the winning bid “holds back” some of his payment for future appraisal
 ∗ actions—

−αρ
∗∗
the optimal appraisal value is even larger, and is equal to r ≡ r 1−α
> r∗ .
Though seemingly counter-intuitive, this result makes sense since the optimal
reserve price must set a floor for the buyer’s total expected payment for the
target; and thus, when bidders rationally shave their nominal bids downward,
an optimal appraisal policy compensates by pushing the appraisal component
of total consideration even higher.
Our central focus in this paper concerns not the design of an optimal
appraisal rule per se. Rather we seek to generate testable predictions about
how a “shock” to appraisal policy plausibly distorts deal pricing, and what
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implications such distortions hold for shareholder welfare. Note further that
in light of the possibility of distributionally non-neutral equilibria (as in the
“coordinated” equilibria in Proposition 1(b)(2)), one might be interested in
two potential vantage points for measuring shareholder value: (1) Aggregate
expected shareholder value, which simply integrates over the payoffs among
shareholders without regard to distribution; or (2) “Maximin” shareholder
value, which focuses on the expected payoffs realized by those shareholders
who receive the lowest payoff from a sale (the “have-nots” in the coordinated
equilibrium above). We will keep track of both measures of welfare in the
discussion below. Several corollaries to Proposition 1 follow immediately from
analysis and comparative statics associated with the equilibria of the auction
game. We list several of them formally below19 :
∗
Corollary 1. When φ < max {rm
, ρ}, expected announcement price and all
measures of expected shareholder welfare are invariant in φ.
∗
Corollary 2. When max {rm
, ρ} ≤ φ and the non-coordinated equilibrium
emerges, expected announcement price and all measures of expected shareholder
welfare are strictly increasing in φ so long as φ ≤ r∗ . If φ > r∗ however,
expected announcement price is strictly increasing in φ, but all measures of
expected shareholder welfare are strictly decreasing in φ.
∗
, ρ} ≤ φ and the coordinated equilibrium emerges,
Corollary 3. When max {rm
expected announcement price may be increasing or decreasing in φ. When
φ ≤ r∗∗ the maximin measure of expected shareholder welfare is strictly increasing in φ if and only if expected acquisition price is also increasing; the aggregate
measure of expected shareholder welfare is weakly increasing if and only if
φ ≤ r∗∗ . When φ > r∗∗ , aggregate shareholder value is weakly decreasing in
φ and maximin shareholder value is increasing only if announcement price is
also increasing.

The most intuitive way understand how Corollaries 1– 3 fit together is
through a graphical representation per Figure 1. The left panel of the Figure
depicts the comparative statics of the model within the “non-coordinated”
equilibrium, while the right panel does the same for the “coordinated” equilibrium. In each panel, the vertical axis depicts the expected appraisal value
∗
(φ), while the horizontal axis depicts max {rm
, ρ}—effectively the maximal
reserve price stemming from managerial bargaining combined with shareholder
voting. Note from both figures that in the lower right triangular region (where
∗
φ < max {rm
, ρ}), appraisal has no equilibrium effect on behavior; consequently, expected pricing and shareholder welfare are invariant to changes in φ.
∗
In the upper left triangular region (where φ ≥ max {rm
, ρ}), changes in φ
generally do affect both pricing and target shareholder welfare—but not always
19 The

proofs of all Corollaries are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Regions and Comparative Statics on Price and Shareholder Welfare

in a uniform way. In the non-coordinated equilibrium (left panel), expected
acquisition prices always increase as φ increases; a result that is unsurprising
given that this equilibrium is the functional equivalent to a second-price auction
with reserve price of φ However, expected shareholder welfare is not monotonic
in φ and it is increasing only so long as φ < r∗ . In the coordinated equilibrium
(right panel), several other factors may be in play, depending on the ordering
∗
of rm
and ρ. What is clear, however, is that so long as φ ≤ r∗∗ increasing
φ always weakly improves aggregate shareholder welfare (even if its effect on
price is ambiguous). Once φ > r∗∗ however, the reverse is true, and expected
target shareholder welfare weakly decreases in φ with indeterminate effects on
equilibrium pricing. A somewhat more complicated picture characterizes the
maximin measure of shareholder welfare, since it is possible that an increase
in appraisal rights may confer benefits on the “haves” in this equilibrium while
making the “have nots” worse off. What is clear is that a necessary condition
for increasing the welfare of the have-nots is if expected announcement price
also increases upon an upward shock to φ.
The heterogeneous comparative statics contained in Corollaries 1–3 and
Figure 1 present a complication to our empirical design for purposes of extracting a “clean” comparative static robust across all equilibria. However,
if one consolidates the observations made above, then one clean prediction
does emerge from the analysis above, at least when one constrains the appraisal rights under the status quo such that φ ≤ r∗ . Combining Corollaries 1
through 3, we have the following central Corollary:
Corollary 4. So long as φ ≤ r∗ both measures of expected shareholder welfare
are increasing in φ if expected announcement price is also increasing in φ.

16

Scott Callahan et al.

Corollary 4 relates shareholder welfare to a readily testable comparative
static on φ (so long as one can be sufficiently confident that its underlying
assumption holds). If we see acquisition prices in appraisal-eligible deals
increase after an upward shock φ it signifies that shareholder welfare must be
increasing as well.
But what of Corollary 4’s predicate assumption that φ ≤ r∗ ? How assuredly
(r ∗ )
does this hold? Recall from the analysis above that r∗ ≡ µ+ 1−F
f (r ∗ ) represents
the familiar, revenue-maximizing reserve in a private-values auction. Is there
any reason to believe that, prior to the 2007 shocks, courts arrived at fair
value appraisals strictly less than this amount? We contend that there is
a good reason to believe so: The statute itself. Recall that DGCL §262
requires the court to peg appraisal value equal to the going-concern value
of the firm under the status quo ante, without any buyer-side synergies. In
our framework, this value is equal to µ by construction, and it is clear that
(r ∗ )
µ = r∗ − 1−F
< r∗ . Thus, so long as courts tend—in expectation—to
f (r ∗ )
comply even approximately with their statutory mandate under appraisal
law, then the condition for Corollary 4 must hold. More formally, so long as
expected appraisal values under the status quo are within the approximate
neighborhood of the representative shareholder’s going-concern value (or if
φ ≈ µ), then a finding that deal premia increase in φ is equivalent to shareholder
welfare also increasing the status quo are within the approximatethe status
quo are within the approximate in φ.
The intuitions contained in Corollaries 1–4 are directly relevant to the next
section, which studies two important and roughly contemporaneous upward
shocks to fair value appraisals.
1. August 2007: Amendment of §262(h) of the DGCL. Under the amendment, Delaware code began granting presumptive pre-judgment interest
in all appraisal actions pegged (absent an override by the Court) a
quarterly compounded quarterly rate of the Federal Reserve discount
rate plus 5%. (DGCL §262(h); Effective August 2007). While pegged to
another section of the Delaware code on pre- and post-judgment interest,
most commentators agree that this statutory reform effectively decoupled
and made the pre-judgment interest return more predictable, creating
nearly instantaneous arbitrage rents.
2. May 2007: In Re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. In Transkaryotic, Chancellor Chandler held that a beneficial owner of stock who
buys after the record date of merger may still assert appraisal right for
those newly purchased shares, and need not prove how such shares were
actually voted pursuant to the direction of the prior beneficial owner.
The impact of this opinion was significant, since it made it much easier for
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hedge funds to engage in appraisal arbitrage, purchasing a large number
of target shares after announcement for their appraisal value—effectively
allowing the arbitrageur to spread the costs of appraisal litigation across
the shares purchased.
The combined effects of the amendment to DGCL §262 and Transkaryotic
are both fairly interpretable as an upward “shock” to anticipated fair value
appraisal (or φ in our model). Consider first the effect of the statutory interest
reform, under which successful claimants would now be able to earn a return
on the financial value of their claims that typically exceeded the risk-adjusted
returns in the market for similar investments. Effectively, the pre-judgment
interest statute gave petitioners a statutory return rs that exceeded the risk
adjusted return in the underlying target/acquirer, E(rA ), compounded over
“T” quarters (where T is usually between 8 and 12 quarters for a standard
appraisal case). Thus, the present value of the of a gross appraisal claim of φ
was shocked upwards by the statutory interest change effectively inducing a
T

1+rs
> φ, effectively
post-interest claim with present value of φ0 = φ · 1+E(r
A)
representing an upward shock to φ.
The Transkaryotic case can be interpreted as visiting a subtler—but conceptually analogous—upward shock in φ, this time due to the economies of
scale in aggregating appraisal claims through market trading. To see this
point, consider a slight extension to our framework in which the net benefit
of appraisal value to the petitioner is equal to φ − c (where c proxies for the
petitioner’s litigation costs). Here, a stockholder’s aggregate holding (dγ)
plays an important role in whether she will seek appraisal, since her benefit
of appraisal over accepting the bid price b is (φ − b) · dγ and her cost is c;
without claims trading, the only litigants who would seek appraisal are those
c
for whom dγ > φ−b
, which would rarely (if ever) happen when the shares are
widely held (so that dγ is infinitesimally small). After Transkaryotic, however,
claims trading could potentially place all the appraisal shares in the hands of a
single party, who exists so long as there is a SH valuing more than the largest
bid price. Absent an appraisal-out or supermajority provision, then, appraisal
could be aggregated across the entire fraction (1−α) of dissenters, who stand to
gain up to (φ − b) · (1 − α) through the action. The now-aggregated shareholder
c
will seek appraisal whenever (1 − α) > φ−b
. By effectively introducing scale
economies in appraisal, Transkaryotic functionally induced an upward shock
in the credibly expected realization of φ within the baseline model.
Together, then, it is fair to conclude that the 2007 reforms visited a
combined upward shock on φ within our model, allowing us to perform a direct
empirical test of Corollary 4’s condition linking price increases to shareholder
welfare. It is to that empirical enterprise that we now turn.
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Sample Creation and Data Description
Sample Creation

To construct our sample, we begin by collecting data on all domestic merger
deals from Thompson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) database.
We select all completed deals with effective dates between January 2003 and
December 2016, resulting in 19,547 observations. We then only include deals
with publicly traded targets that are incorporated in the state of Delaware.
Furthermore, consistent with Hsieh and Walkling (2005) and Jiang et al. (2016),
we exclude all deals classified as recapitalizations, repurchases, spinoffs, and
divestures, as they are not generally considered as merger activity and would
not be eligible in any circumstances for appraisal rights. Finally, we drop all
duplicate observations, and any observations missing deal premium data from
the SDC database. Our final sample consists of 2,083 unique deals.
3.2

Definition and Sources of Variables

Our principal dependent variable of interest is gross deal premiums (gross_prem),
defined as the bid price bid price divided by the target’s closing stock price
one week prior to deal announcement. The top panel of Figure 2 shows that
deal premiums are highly skewed. Accordingly, we winsorize the variable at
the 1% and 99% level, and—as in Roll (1988) and Dari-Mattiacci and Talley
(2016)—take the natural logarithm of the gross premium (ln(gross_prem)).
We call this variable ln(gross_prem). The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows
that the right-tail skewness is visibly reduced.
The SDC database also provides us with deal characteristic information
such as announcement date, effective date, deal size, and form of consideration
(percentage of payment to target shareholders in stock, cash, other and/or
unknown). SDC additionally provides data on target and acquirer firm characteristics at the time of the merger such as total assets, total debt, net income,
and industry SIC codes. The three target firm control variables we use are:
ln(Assets), which is the natural logarithm of the target firm’s total assets as of
the date of the most current financial statement prior to deal announcement;
Leverage, which is the target firm’s book value of debt divided by total assets;
and ROA, the ratio of the target firm’s most recent 12-month net income
divided by its total assets. All three variables are taken from the target firm’s
most recent financial statement prior to the date of the merger announcement.
In addition, we define a dummy variable, Private, which is set to unity if SDC
has flagged the deal as a “going private” transaction, and zero otherwise.
In order to control for industry effects, we use the SIC codes to construct
ten industry dummy variables according to the Fama-French industry classifications. We also create a dummy variable for related deals: If both the target
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and acquiring firm are in the same industry and share the same three-digit
SIC code we set the variable related to unity, and set it to zero otherwise.
We supplement our observations with economic data from the St. Louis
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) to include information on interest
rates, unemployment, GDP growth, and inflation at the time of each merger
deal. We create an opportunity cost variable, op_cost, that is defined as the
difference between the high quality 10-year corporate bond yield and the onemonth federal funds rate during the month of each observation. The monthly
federal funds rate, not seasonally adjusted, is used to construct the variable
Fed_funds. Quarterly GDP growth from the quarter one-year ago, seasonally
adjusted, is used for the variable GDP. Monthly civilian unemployment rates
and urban consumer price index growth rates are used to construct UNEMP
and CPI, respectively. Finally, the daily CBOE Volatility Index value is used
to construct VIX. A summary of the variables used is listed in Table 1.
3.3

Determination of Appraisal Eligibility

To determine whether a deal is eligible for appraisal we start by analyzing
the form of consideration data from SDC. Because the DGCL 262(b) restores
appraisal rights for deals that require target shareholders to accept cash
consideration, we exclude all deals involving a 100% stock consideration from
our treatment group. (We tested a random sample of 100 deals that SDC has
labeled as “100% stock” by checking their merger agreements to verify that
SDC’s classification is accurate; all were classified correctly.)
Due to the existence of some ‘exceptions-to-the-cash’ rules in Delaware law
concerning cash payments and the fact that SDC classifications of “unknown”
and “other” are too vague to determine appraisal eligibility, we manually
examined merger agreements and 8-K filings from the SEC EDGAR database
for all remaining (i.e., non-100% stock) deals. The first exception-to-the-cash
rule is the occurrence of an apparently all-stock deal which offers the payment
of a special dividend immediately prior to the merger that is contingent on
shareholder approval. The Delaware Chancery Court deemed that shareholders
in such cases are entitled to appraisal rights.20 SDC includes these special
cash dividends as “other” in combination with a portion of the consideration
classified as “stock.” These cases were identified and included in the treatment
group. The second exception-to-the-cash rule occurs when shareholders are
given the option to elect whether they receive a cash or stock consideration. In
such cases, the Chancery Court has ruled that appraisal rights are not available
to target shareholders, as appraisal rights are only awarded when accepting cash
consideration is mandatory.21 To account for these cases, merger agreement
forms for all deals classified by SDC as having any portion of consideration
Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Crawford (2007)
v. Wesco Financial Corp. (2011).

20 Louisiana
21 Krieger
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Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables

Variable

Description [Source]

ln(Gross_prem)

Natural logarithm of one plus the premium of offer
price to target closing stock price one-week prior to
the original announcement date. [SDC]
Natural logarithm of the target firm’s total assets as
of the date of the most current financial information
prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil).
[SDC]
Target’s book value of debt as of the date of the most
current financial information available prior to the
announcement of the transaction) divided by target’s
total assets. [SDC]
Ratio of the target firm’s most recent 12-month net
income divided by its total assets. [SDC]
Dummy variable set to unity if the merger is a going
private deal, and zero otherwise. [SDC]
Indicator if the target firm and the acquirer firm are
in the same industry. Dummy variable set to unity if
both firms share the same 3-digit SIC code, and zero
otherwise. [SDC]
10-year high quality corporate bond par yield (AAA,
AA, and A rated), monthly, not seasonally adjusted
minus the effective federal funds rate, monthly, not
seasonally adjusted. [FRED]
Effective federal funds rate, monthly, not seasonally
adjusted. [FRED]
Growth in real gross domestic product, % change from
quarter one-year ago, quarterly, seasonally adjusted.
[FRED]

ln(assets)

Leverage

ROA
Private
Related

Op_cost

Fed_funds
GDP

UNEMP
CPI VIX

civilian unemployment rate, monthly, seasonally adjusted. [FRED]
consumer price index for all urban consumers: all
items, index 1982–1984 = 100, monthly, seasonally
adjusted. [FRED]
The daily CBOE Volatility Index measurement of the
market’s expectation of 30-day volatility based on the
S&P 500 index option prices
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paid in cash were manually collected and examined for appraisal rights terms
and conditions. The above procedure results in 1,465 appraisal-eligible deals
out of our total sample of 2,083 unique deals.
3.4

Descriptive Statistics

We begin by examining the descriptive statistics of our variables in Table 2.
We observe that the average deal premium for our full sample is a 34% increase
in the bid price over the target firm’s stock price one-week prior to deal
announcement. In Panel B, we separate our observations into two subsections
according to whether the deal terms allow for appraisal rights or not. We
observe that those deals that are eligible for appraisal rights on average have
slightly higher deal premiums (35%) than those deals that are not appraisal
eligible (24%). Furthermore, appraisal eligible deals tend to have targets with
lower levels of debt (23.7%, compared with 50.5% for non-eligible deals). Not
surprisingly, appraisal-eligible deals also had a higher probability of being a
“going private” deals, with about 32% of the sample deals being classified as
going private, compared with only 8% of the non-eligible sample. Deals where
the target and acquiring firm are both in the same industry also had a slightly
greater incidence of appraisal-eligible deals than in non-eligible deals, with 45%
and 31% of deals, respectively, occurring between firms in related industries.
In Panel C, we investigate shifting trends in our variables over time by
dividing our data observations into three time periods: the period prior
to the Transkaryotic opinion (January 1, 2003 to May 1, 2007); the time
between Transkaryotic and the effective date of the pre-judgment interest
amendment (May 2, 2007 to July 31, 2007); and after the pre-judgement
interest amendment (August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2016). We observe that
bid premiums increased to an average of 32% after the pre-judgment interest
reform compared to an average premium of 28% before the Transkaryotic court
ruling. In addition, there was a slightly larger representation of “going private”
transactions before Transkaryotic (21% of deals) versus after the pre-judgement
statute (19%). The proportion of deals between firms in related industries
increased from 38% before Transkaryotic to 41% after the pre-judgement
statute.

4
4.1

Empirical Tests and Results
Effect of Appraisal Eligibility on Bid Premiums

In Table 3 we present the results of our regression analysis of the effects of
appraisal eligibility on announced premia. We consider all 2,083 observations
over the entire period of our study (2003–2016). Our dependent variable,

Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value

23

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample
Variable
Gross_prem
ln(Gross_prem)
ln(assets)
Leverage
ROA
Private
Related

Mean

Median

s.d.

0.336
0.247
5.939
0.377
−0.314
0.188
0.375

0.257
0.228
5.907
0.204
0.001
0
0

0.428
0.289
2.368
1.674
2.51
0.391
0.484

Panel B: Appraisal Eligibility
Variable
Gross_prem
ln(Gross_prem)
ln(assets)
Leverage
ROA
Private
Related

Appraisal Eligible
Mean
Median
0.348
0.288
5.918
0.237
−0.092
0.319
0.452

0.298
0.261
5.82
0.135
0.016
0
0

Non-Appraisal Eligible
Mean
Median
s.d.

s.d.
0.418
0.265
1.885
0.371
0.885
0.466
0.498

0.237
0.161
5.957
0.505
−0.517
0.078
0.311

0.147
0.137
6.008
0.282
−0.028
0
0

0.432
0.317
2.739
2.286
3.362
0.268
0.463

Panel C: Three Time Periods

Variable

Before Transkaryotic
(05/02/04–05/01/07)
Mean Median s.d.

Gross_prem
0.278
ln(Gross_prem) 0.214
ln(assets)
5.584
Leverage
0.280
ROA
−0.161
Private
0.205
Related
0.382

0.230
0.207
5.522
0.177
0.007
0
0

Between TT
and Pre-judgment
(05/02/07–07/31/07)
Mean Median s.d.

0.337 0.228
0.247 0.192
2.187 6.000
0.145 0.446
0.653 −0.467
0.404 0.177
0.486 0.359

0.230
0.206
5.973
0.203
0.000
0
0

After Pre-judgement
(08/01/07–08/01/10)
Mean Median s.d.

0.212 0.319
0.240 0.471
0.161 0.221
0.215 0.334
2.568 6.469
6.601 1.976
2.349 0.369
0.263 0.525
3.523 −0.176 −0.006 0.389
0.382 0.186
0
0.389
0.48 0.408
0
0.492

ln(gross_prem), is regressed over ten different specifications to evaluate the
significance of our variable of interest, Appr. Eligible. In column [1], we use a
simple OLS regression of the appraisal eligibility dummy on log gross premiums,
without any control variables. Columns [2] and [3] include a set of control
variables for deal characteristics and macroeconomic effects, respectively. Deal
characteristic controls include Target ROA, Target Leverage, and dummies for
Going Private, and Related. Macroeconomic controls include our measure of
opportunity cost, op_cost, as well as the quarterly Fed Funds rate, GDP growth,
unemployment rate, inflation rate, and the 30-day market’s expectations of
S&P 500 volatility.
In columns [4] through [6] we include industry dummy variables based
on the ten Fama-French industry classifications to control for industry fixedeffects. Columns [7] and [8] include quarterly dummies to control for time
fixed-effects and columns [9] and [10] include both industry and quarterly

Quarterly dummies
Industry dummies
n
Adjusted R2
p-value that industry effects = 0
p-value that macro effects = 0

Constant

VIX

CPI

UNEMP

GDP

Fed_funds

Op_cost

Related

Private

Leverage

ROA

ln(assets)

Appr. Eligible

y = ln(gross_prem)

0.161∗∗∗
(13.22)
No
No
2,083
0.0424

0.127∗∗∗
(9.02)

[1]

[3]

0.0001∗∗∗

0.135∗∗∗
0.135∗∗∗
(9.14)
(8.98)
−0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(−4.89)
(−4.93)
0.004
0.006
(0.23)
(0.33)
−0.003
−0.002
(−0.43)
(−0.41)
−0.018
−0.017
(−1.07)
(−1.00)
0.011
0.011
(0.85)
(0.83)
−0.037∗∗∗
(−3.43)
−0.032∗∗∗
(−3.49)
−0.007
(−1.19)
−0.001
(−0.10)
−0.0001
(−0.13)
0.003∗∗
(2.10)
∗∗∗
0.260
0.445∗∗
(9.11)
(2.72)
No
No
No
No
2,037
2,037
0.0678
0.0815

[2]

0.133∗∗∗
(8.74)
No
Yes
2,083
0.0651
0.0001∗∗∗

0.111∗∗∗
(7.62)

[4]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

0.122∗∗∗
0.121∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
0.108∗∗∗
0.118∗∗∗
(7.97)
(7.77)
(8.51)
(8.71)
(7.17)
(7.58)
−0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
−0.017∗∗∗
−0.013∗∗∗
(−3.56)
(−3.46)
(−4.70)
(−3.37)
0.011
0.012
0.008
0.013
(0.60)
(0.71)
(0.47)
(0.88)
−0.001
−0.001
−0.003
−0.002
(−0.26)
(−0.22)
(−0.52)
(−0.36)
−0.010
−0.009
−0.016
−0.010
(−0.59)
(−0.54)
(−0.97)
(−0.59)
−0.001
−0.001
0.011
0.001
(−0.08)
(−0.08)
(0.86)
(−0.05)
−0.038∗∗∗
(−3.52)
−0.033∗∗∗
(−3.60)
−0.007
(−1.21)
0.0001
(0.02)
−0.0002
(−0.32)
.003∗∗
(2.09)
∗∗∗
0.211
0.415∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
0.131∗∗∗
0.252∗∗∗
(6.74)
(2.58)
(3.21)
(3.95)
(2.67)
(3.35)
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
2,037
2,037
2,083
2,037
2,083
2,037
0.0837
0.0974
0.0816
0.1053
0.1013
0.1197
0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
∗∗∗
0.0000

[5]

Table 3: Prediction of Appraisal Eligibility on Bid Premiums. In this table, we provide the results of ten ordinary least squares models in
which the dependent variable is Ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium. The regression
includes all deals from the full time range of our sample, 1/1/2003–12/31/2016. The coefficient of interest is the variable Appr. Eligible,
which captures the difference in premiums of those deals which are eligible for appraisal rights from those in our control sample. Columns
[4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for industry fixed effects using the ten SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications. We use robust
standard errors and the t-statistics are in parentheses. We follow the following indicators of statistical significance: ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01,
∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗ indicates p < 0.10.
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fixed-effects. Specifications that include both quarterly fixed-effects dummies
and macroeconomic variables were excluded due to the collinearity of the two
sets of controls.
Across all specifications, we find our variable of interest, Appr. Eligible, is
statistically significant at the 1% level. This provides strong evidence that a
deal being eligible for appraisal predicts higher premia for target shareholders,
with average one-week deal premiums increasing anywhere between 11.4%–
14.4%,22 depending on which specification we consider. We interpret our
results to provide evidence that appraisal rights petitions are not nuisance
suits, but instead offer a benefit to all target shareholders. It is consistent with
the notion that the credible threat of appraisal litigation may be deterrent
effect for an acquiring firm to increase its bid, therefore benefiting all target
shareholders, and not just those filing the lawsuits. (Although other factors
contribute to this premium as well—such as the greater likelihood that taxable
deals are appraisal eligible—we show below that this premium is not fully
explained by the taxability of the deal.)
4.2

Effects of the 2007 Shocks on Deal Premiums

We turn next to an analysis of the effect that the 2007 “shocks” to appraisal
had on merger deal premiums. As noted by Myers and Korsmo (2014), the
Transkaryotic opinion is broadly thought to have catalyzed a surge in appraisal
petition activity and created a large change in the use of appraisal in Delaware.
In addition, appraisal arbitrage incentives were further fed by an amendment
to the Delaware appraisal statute regarding pre-judgement interest rates that
occurred six days after the Transkaryotic opinion was released. As noted above,
under this proposed amendment (which became effective August 1, 2007),
appraisal petitioners would be presumptively entitled to pre-judgment interest
pegged at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate, compounded quarterly,
up to the date of the judgment. Due to the potential combined shock of the
two events, we deem the (excluded) “event window” to be the period between
Transkaryotic (May 2, 2007) and the effective date of the statutory amendment
(August 1, 2007). We use a difference-in-differences model to test the effect of
this event. We restrict our sample of observations to three years before and
three years after our event date, (though all results hold when we use a time
period of two years before and after the event window as well).
We estimate the following difference-in-differences model:
ln (1 + P remiumi ) = f (Zi ; αi ) + β0 ∗ Appr Eligiblei + β1 ∗ P ostEventi
+ β2 ∗ Appr Eligiblei × P ost_Eventi + εi

(4)

22 Marginal effects of the Appr. Eligible coefficients are derived from the regression
coefficients by using the functional transformation eβ − 1. The reported range is taken from
the lowest and highest coefficient values of the Appr. Eligible variable reported in Table 3.
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where:
f (Zi , αi ) = set of control variables Zi and estimated coefficients αi
Appr. Eligiblei = 1 ⇔ Transaction was eligible for appraisal rights
Post_Eventi = 1 ⇔ Date of announcement is after excluded event
window
We define our treatment group as all deals that are appraisal eligible and
the control group as all deals that are not appraisal eligible. Our set of control
variables and ten different model specifications remain consistent with the
previous section and Table 3. As noted above, we use the log of one-week
gross deals premiums as our dependent variable, and pay interest to the β2
coefficient, which identifies the differential effect of appraisal rights on merger
premiums after the 2007 shocks.
Table 4 reports the results of our difference-in-differences model. We
find across all ten model specifications a significantly positive effect on our
treatment group after the event date. This suggests that 2007 shocks had
the effect of increasing bid premiums for those deals eligible for appraisal
rights, above that of our control sample. Depending on the specification, the
economic impact of the 2007 shocks to a range of 9.7%–17.2% increase in gross
premiums for appraisal eligible deals.23
Additionally, in all of the models that included deal characteristic controls
(columns [2], [3], [5], [6], [8], and [10]), Target ROA is associated with a
higher deal premium. Target firm size, as measured by total assets, also has a
statistically significant in four of the six specifications that it is included in
(columns [2], [3], [5], and [8]). Our results indicate that target size is negatively
associated with deal premiums.
The positive significance of deal premiums for appraisal-eligible deals
after the 2007 shocks is consistent with a beneficial effect that the appraisalliberalizing 2007 shocks had for all target shareholders. Recall from Corollary 4
above that so long as the status quo appraisal value is below the optimal reserve
price (as the appraisal statute seems to require), shareholder welfare improves
if and only if acquisition prices also increase after the shock. The results above
demonstrate the latter, facilitating a fair inference of the former. We thus
interpret the results to be consistent with the argument that appraisal arbitrage
opportunities after the 2007 shocks have had an overall effect of inducing higher
bid premiums and higher overall target shareholder value. Consistent with
our model, this effect would beneficial for all target shareholders, not just the
petitioners of these lawsuits (notwithstanding the possibility that petitioners
gained even more).
23 In unreported regressions (available from authors), we include several other notable
post-2007 cases as candidate shocks (such as the Ancestry.com and Huff v. CKx opinions,
finding no economically or statistically notable effects.

∗

Appr. Eligible

Quarterly dummies
Industry dummies
n
Adjusted R2
p-value that industry effects = 0
p-value that macro effects = 0

Constant

VIX

CPI

UNEMP

GDP

Fed_funds

Op_cost

Related

Private

Leverage

ROA

ln(assets)

Post_Event

Post_Event

Appr. Eligible

y = ln(gross_prem)

0.171∗∗∗
(7.44)
No
No
987
0.054

0.255∗∗∗
(6.46)
No
No
971
0.087

[2]
0.071∗∗∗
(2.71)
−0.041
(−1.26)
0.105∗∗∗
(2.69)
−0.018∗∗∗
(−3.61)
0.021∗∗
(2.03)
0.002
(0.54)
−0.002
(−0.09)
0.035∗
(1.86)

[1]

0.064∗∗
(2.47)
−0.057
(−1.66)
0.121∗∗∗
(3.03)

0.153

0.071∗∗∗
(2.72)
−0.136∗∗
(−2.56)
0.113∗∗∗
(2.73)
−0.016∗∗∗
(−3.27)
0.020∗∗
(2.10)
0.002
(0.54)
0.000
(0.00)
0.034∗
(1.86)
−0.029
(−1.31)
−0.036
(−1.20)
−0.009
(−0.98)
−0.009
(−0.51)
−0.005
(1.64)
0.001
(0.47)
−0.424
(−0.91)
No
No
971
0.096

[3]

0.134∗∗∗
(5.14)
No
Yes
987
0.077
0.002∗∗∗

0.058∗∗
(2.26)
−0.050
(−1.48)
0.106∗∗∗
(2.67)

[4]

0.191∗∗∗
(4.23)
No
Yes
971
0.103
0.0305∗∗

0.063∗∗
(2.50)
−0.036
(−1.14)
0.093∗∗
(2.45)
−0.012∗∗
(−2.32)
0.025∗∗∗
(2.58)
0.002
(0.81)
0.012
(0.49)
0.024
(1.24)

[5]
0.058∗∗
(2.03)
−0.082
(−1.40)
0.159∗∗
(2.47)
−0.009
(−1.34)
0.024∗∗∗
(2.62)
0.003
(1.03)
0.022
(0.78)
0.038
(1.38)
−0.012
(−0.23)
−0.001
(−0.02)
−0.023∗
(−1.75)
0.025
(0.81)
−0.003
(−0.55)
−0.005
(−0.81)
0.907
(0.91)
No
Yes
971
0.111
0.067∗
0.126

[6]

0.165∗∗∗
(2.61)
Yes
No
987
0.085

0.132∗∗∗
(3.19)

0.062∗∗
(2.39)

[7]

0.254∗∗∗
(3.62)
Yes
No
971
0.113

0.116∗∗∗
(2.90)
−0.016∗∗∗
(−3.20)
0.021∗∗
(2.38)
0.001
(0.20)
0.005
(0.23)
0.034
(1.79)

0.067∗∗∗
(2.66)

[8]

0.142∗∗
(2.23)
Yes
Yes
987
0.104
0.005∗∗∗

0.117∗∗∗
(2.84)

0.055∗∗
(2.17)

[9]

0.197∗∗∗
(2.64)
Yes
Yes
971
0.128
0.048∗∗

0.104∗∗∗
(2.63)
−0.010∗
(−1.93)
0.024∗∗∗
(2.90)
0.001
(0.43)
0.018
(0.76)
0.023
(1.19)

0.060∗∗
(2.42)

[10]

Table 4: Difference-in-Differences (three years before TT, three years after pre-judgment). In this table, we provide the results of ten
ordinary least squares models in which the dependent variable is ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal
premium. The regressions include all deals from the 3 years before the Transkaryotic court ruling (5/2/2007) and the 3 years following the
pre-judgement interest ruling (8/1/2007). The coefficient of interest is the variable After Interest * Appr. Eligible, which captures the effect
in the post-event treatment group from those in our control sample. Columns [4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for industry fixed effects
using the ten SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications. We use robust standard errors and the t-statistics are in parentheses. We
follow the following indicators of statistical significance: ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗ indicates p < 0.10.
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Table 5: Appraisal Eligible Deal Count. In column [1] of this table, we provide the results a
Negative Binomial model in which the dependent variable is the number of appraisal eligible
deals completed per quarter. Column [2] provides the results a tobit regression model in
which the dependent variable is the number of appraisal eligible deals completed divided by
the total number of deals completed per quarter. The regression includes merger deals from
1/1/2003–12/31/2016. The coefficient of interest is the variable Post_TT, which captures
the effect of the Transkayotic court ruling on the total number of deals (proportion of
deals) eligible for appraisal rights. We use robust standard errors. T -statistics are provided
below correlation coefficients in parenthesis. We follow the following indicators of statistical
significance: ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗ indicates p < 0.10.

Total deals
Post_Event
Constant
Obs
Adjusted R2

4.3

[1]
y = appraisal eligible deal
eligible deal
count per quarter

[2]
y = proportion of
appraisal eligible
deals to total
deals per quarter

0.010∗∗∗
(5.18)
−0.692
(−1.03)
2.689∗∗∗
(22.59)

−0.034
(−1.11)
0.488∗∗∗
(23.22)

56
0.0574

56
0.0149

Effects of the 2007 Shocks on Takeover Rates

Our findings that deal premiums increased after the 2007 shocks catalyzed
appraisal arbitrage is fully consistent with our model’s prediction of enhanced
shareholder value. However, we reiterate that the inference on shareholder
welfare requires an assumption that appraisal valuations tend to comply with
the statutory mandate of awarding going concern value (or in µ our model).
While we believe this to be a reasonable assumption, one might further
interrogate it by investigating whether the 2007 shocks had a measurable
chilling impact on takeover rates in appraisal-eligible deals. That is, the
inference that shareholder welfare also improves (along with deal premia)
might appear questionable if the 2007 reforms caused acquiring firms to shift
dramatically away from deal terms and conditions that allow for appraisal
rights.
To investigate this question, we run two regression models for deal completion rates. Results are reported in Table 5. First, we run a Negative Binomial
regression model to determine the effect of the 2007 shocks on the number
of appraisal eligible deals. The dependent variable, eligibledeals, is a count of
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the number of merger deals completed per quarter that had appraisal rights
available to shareholders. The Post-Event coefficient is insignificant, indicating
that the court decisions had no significant impact on deal terms that would
shift towards a decrease in the availability of appraisal rights. Next, we run a
Tobit regression to determine the effect of the court decisions on the proportion
of appraisal eligible deals to total deals available per quarter. The Post-Event
coefficient is again insignificant, indicating that the court decision had no
significant impact on the structuring of deal terms that allow for appraisal
rights petitions.
In summary, the above results show that appraisal eligible deals earn higher
deal premiums than non-appraisal eligible deals and this difference increases
after the 2007 shocks. We also find no statistically meaningful impact of
appraisal eligibility and the 2007 shocks on takeover rates. In the next section,
we examine the robustness of the deal premium results.
4.4
4.4.1

Robustness Tests
Parallel Trend Assumption

The first robustness check examines the key identifying assumption of the
difference-in-differences design—that the treatment group and the control
group both follow parallel trends prior to the event date and that there was
no indication of any systematic pre-trend during the time leading up to the
Transkaryotic decision. That is to say, that in the absence Transkaryotic, any
difference in merger bid premiums would remain similar between appraisal
eligible deals and non-eligible deals over time.
Figure 3 illustrates a leads and lags plot of the difference in average bid
premia for appraisal eligible deals versus non-eligible deals for the eight quarters
before and after our event date (where the event date is the period between
the 5/2/2007 Transkaryotic ruling and the 8/1/2007 interest amendment
declaration). The regression coefficient of interest is of the Appr. Eligible
indicator variable, wherein ln(gross_prem) is regressed on Appr. Eligible and
firm and deal characteristics. Each regression coefficient and its error band at
the 95% confidence interval is plotted for the sixteen quarters around the event
date. A fitted line of the eight regression coefficients before the event date,
and the fitted line of the eight regression coefficients after the event date, is
used to illustrate any trends. Prior to the event date there a slight downward
trend (if any significant trend at all) in higher deal premiums for appraisal
eligible deals as the coefficients approach the event date. After the event date,
however, we observe a noticeable increasing trend in appraisal eligible deal
premiums over those for non-eligible deals.
Figure 4 shows a parallel trends plot of the average ln(gross_prem), sorted
into treatment and control groups for 12 quarters before and after the event
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Coefficients and Confidence Intervals
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5

Leads and Lags Plot for Appraisal Eligible Bid Premiums

−10

−5
0
5
Quarters from Event (5/2/07−8/1/07)

10

95% CI
Fitted values

Figure 3: Leads and Lags: This Figure plots pre- and post-time trends bid premia for the
treatment and control groups. The x-axis is the number of quarters between the Transkaryotic/interest pre-judgement court rulings. Coefficients are from the Appraisal Eligible
indicator variable on the OLS model on ln(1wkprem) including deal/firm characteristic and
industry control variables. 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients are shown.

date. Residuals are from the OLS model predicting ln(gross_prem) with
control variables for economic, industry, deal, and firm characteristics. As
visible from the plot, trends in bid premiums over time for our treatment and
control groups have no apparent trend prior to the event date. It is not until
after the event that we observe that our treatment group shifts towards higher
bid premiums when compared to the control group.
Following the methodology of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Bishop et al.
(2017), we perform a “balance test” using regressions to test whether there was
any significant pre-trend between our control and treatment groups in the two
years before the Transkaryotic ruling.24 We use the following specification:
ln(1 + Premiumi ) = β0 ∗ Appr. Eligiblei + β1 ∗ τi,t
+ β2 ∗ (Appr. Eligiblei × τi,t ) + εi,t

(5)

24 This methodology was also used by Bishop et al. (2017). Activist Directors and Information Leakage (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia Law School).
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Residuals
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Parallel Trends
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Quarters from Event (5/2/2007−8/1/2007)
Appraisal Eligible

10
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Figure 4: Parallel Trends: This Figure plots pre- and post-time trends for the residuals
of bid premia for the treatment and control groups. The x-axis is the number of quarters
between the Transkaryotic/interest pre-judgement court rulings. We average the log premia
by treatment and control group for each quarter. The treatment group, appraisal eligible
deals, is plotted in blue, while the control group, non-eligible deals, is plotted in red, in the
Figure below.

where Appr. Eligiblei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a deal is appraisal
eligible; τi,t is the number of quarters before the Transkaryotic ruling; and
εi,t is a random error term. The difference-in-differences coefficient of interest
is β2 , which indicates the difference in the quarterly time trend between the
treatment and control groups after the 2007 reforms. Results are shown in
Table 6. We find that β2 is not statistically different from zero, suggesting
that there was no significant systematic pre-trend between the two groups
before the event dates.
4.4.2

Change in Event Dates

Tables 7 and 8 provide additional robustness tests to show that our decision
to use the time window between the Transkaryotic ruling and the interest
pre-judgement is appropriate. We run our difference-in-differences model as we
did in Section 4.2 adjusting our event date to different specifications. Table 7
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Table 6: Robustness Test 1—Balance Test (Parallel Trends Analysis)

2 years prior to Transkaryotic
Ln(GrossPrem)
Appr. Eligible
TTqtr
TTqtr * Appr. Eligible
const

coeff.

t-stat.

0.0712
−0.0008
0.0038
0.1946

1.31
−0.09
0.34
4.15

provides results from using only the May 2, 2007 Transkaryotic case ruling as
the event date. The sample includes all observations three years before and
three years after the court ruling. Our variable of interest, the interaction
variable After TT * Appr. Eligible, remains statistically significant across all
specifications, with the exceptions of columns [5] and [6] in which case statistical
significance decreases from the 1% level to the 5% level. Table 8 provides
results for when only the August 1, 2007 interest payment pre-judgement
amendment date is used. Results remain significant across all specifications,
and all coefficients of interest remain in the range of the results obtained from
the original event date specification.
4.4.3

Tax Considerations

To make sure that the increase in merger premiums is not traceable to tax
considerations when cash is the medium of exchange in the transaction, we
manually code the tax status of each deal under prevailing IRS rules. Table 9
provides results of our regression analysis of the effects of appraisal eligibility
on shareholder wealth when only non-taxable deals are considered. In the
table, we reduce our sample to only deals that are classified as non-taxable
by the Delaware corporate law code. This reduces our sample size to 203
non-taxable deals over the entire sample period of 2003–2016. Our dependent
variable, ln(GrossPrem), still shows a significant increase in deal premiums in
the range of 6.6%–9.4% for appraisal eligible deals above those premiums for
deals not eligible for appraisal rights. These results are consistent when we
apply the full models with our control variables and economic controls, as well
as our full model with control variables and quarterly fixed effects.

5

Conclusion

This paper has developed, analyzed, and tested an auction-design framework
in the mergers and acquisitions context to explore the plausible effects of a

Quarterly dummies
Industry dummies
n
Adjusted R2
p-value that industry effects = 0
p-value that macro effects = 0

Constant

VIX

CPI

UNEMP

GDP

Fed_funds

Op_cost

Related

Private

Leverage

ROA

ln(assets)

After TT * Appr. Eligible

After TT

Appr. Eligible

y = ln(gross_prem)

0.166∗∗∗
(6.86)
No
No
1,012
0.045

0.254∗∗∗
(5.89)
No
No
996
0.073

[2]
0.074∗∗∗
(2.71)
−0.045
(−1.26)
0.090∗∗
(2.17)
−0.018∗∗∗
(−3.34)
0.021∗∗
(1.97)
0.002
(0.47)
−0.002
(−0.08)
0.028
(1.48)

[1]

0.069∗∗
(2.51)
−0.059
(−1.59)
0.104∗∗
(2.47)

0.073∗

0.072∗∗∗
(2.74)
−0.130∗∗∗
(−2.69)
0.093∗∗
(2.28)
−0.016∗∗∗
(−3.27)
0.021∗∗
(2.05)
0.001
(0.44)
−0.001
(−0.06)
0.027
(1.49)
−0.037
(−1.32)
−0.035
(−1.25)
−0.008
(−0.73)
−0.009
(−0.46)
0.005∗
(1.87)
0.001
(0.39)
−0.360
(−1.06)
No
No
996
0.083

[3]

0.131∗∗∗
(4.83)
No
Yes
1,012
0.068
0.006∗∗∗

0.060∗∗
(2.28)
−0.054
(−1.50)
0.091∗∗
(2.20)

[4]

0.187∗∗∗
(3.86)
No
Yes
996
0.090
0.012∗∗

0.066∗∗
(2.50)
−0.041
(−1.20)
0.079∗∗
(1.97)
−0.012∗∗
(−2.07)
0.026∗∗∗
(2.66)
0.002
(0.81)
0.012
(0.48)
0.019
(0.96)

[5]
0.064∗∗
(2.52)
−0.121∗∗
(−2.54)
0.083∗∗
(2.09)
−0.010∗∗
(−2.00)
0.025∗∗∗
(2.73)
0.002
(0.79)
0.011
(0.45)
0.018
(0.99)
−0.029
(−1.29)
−0.032
(−1.11)
−0.007
(−0.59)
−0.003
(−0.15)
0.005∗
(1.67)
0.001
(0.46)
−0.507
(−1.09)
No
Yes
996
0.084
0.015∗∗
0.070∗

[6]

0.176∗∗∗
(3.23)
Yes
No
1,012
0.079

0.119∗∗∗
(2.86)

0.064∗∗
(2.44)

[7]

0.211∗∗∗
(4.76)
Yes
No
996
0.101

0.107∗∗∗
(2.65)
−0.016∗∗∗
(−2.88)
0.021∗∗
(2.43)
0.001
(0.19)
0.003
(0.12)
0.027
(1.38)

0.069∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(2.67)

[8]

0.141∗∗
(2.35)
Yes
Yes
1,012
0.099
0.002∗∗∗

0.106∗∗∗
(2.58)

0.060∗∗
(2.16)

[9]

0.139∗∗∗
(2.73)
Yes
Yes
996
0.118
0.016∗∗

0.096∗∗
(2.42)
−0.010∗
(−1.66)
0.025∗∗∗
(3.11)
0.001
(0.49)
0.015
(0.63)
0.017
(0.88)

(2.37)

[10]

Table 7: Robustness Test 2—Change of Event Date to Transkaryotic Ruling. In this table, we provide the results of ten ordinary least
squares models in which the dependent variable is ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium.
The regressions include all deals from the 3 years before and after the Transkaryotic court ruling (5/2/2007). The coefficient of interest
is the variable After TT * Appr. Eligible, which captures the effect in the post-event treatment group from those in our control sample.
Columns [4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for industry fixed effects using the ten SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications. We use
robust standard errors and the t-statistics are in parentheses. We follow the following indicators of statistical significance: ∗∗∗ indicates
p < 0.01, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗ indicates p < 0.10.
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∗

Appr.

Quarterly dummies
Industry dummies
n
Adjusted R2
p-value that industry effects = 0
p-value that macro effects = 0

Constant

VIX

CPI

UNEMP

GDP

Fed_funds

Op_cost

Related

Private

Leverage

ROA

After Interest
Eligible
ln(assets)

After Interest Amendment

Appr. Eligible

y = ln(gross_prem)

0.173∗∗∗
(6.85)
No
No
996
0.054

0.263∗∗∗
(5.98)
No
No
981
0.084

[2]
0.066∗∗
(2.35)
− 0.063∗
(− 1.67)
0.127∗∗∗
(2.95)
− 0.018∗∗∗
(− 3.33)
0.022∗∗
(2.35)
0.002
(0.71)
− 0.001
(− 0.05)
0.022
(1.57)

[1]

0.059∗∗
(2.13)
− 0.077∗∗
(− 2.01)
0.142∗∗∗
(3.24)

0.325

0.061∗∗
(2.30)
− 0.114∗∗
(− 2.30)
0.122∗∗∗
(2.95)
− 0.016∗∗∗
(− 3.26)
0.021∗∗
(2.25)
0.002
(0.59)
0.001
(0.07)
0.032∗
(1.71)
− 0.026
(− 1.13)
− 0.032
(− 1.10)
− 0.006
(− 0.74)
− 0.005
(− 0.32)
0.003
(1.16)
0.001
(0.34)
− 0.168
(− 0.37)
No
No
981
0.093

[3]

0.135∗∗∗
(4.62)
No
Yes
996
0.079
0.001∗∗∗

0.052∗
(1.90)
− 0.071∗
(− 1.88)
0.128∗∗∗
(2.94)

[4]

0.193∗∗∗
(3.82)
No
Yes
981
0.103
0.003∗∗∗

0.057∗∗
(2.10)
− 0.058
(− 1.59)
0.115∗∗∗
(2.72)
− 0.012∗∗
(− 2.06)
0.027∗∗∗
(3.31)
0.003
(1.18)
0.015
(0.60)
0.019
(0.92)

[5]
0.054∗∗
(2.10)
− 0.109∗∗
(− 2.24)
0.110∗∗∗
(2.71)
− 0.010∗
(− 1.93)
0.026∗∗∗
(3.16)
0.003
(1.04)
0.015
(0.65)
0.020
(1.06)
− 0.026
(− 1.16)
− 0.029
(− 0.98)
− 0.006
(− 0.67)
− 0.001
(− 0.04)
0.003
(1.11)
0.001
(0.42)
− 0.249
(− 0.55)
No
Yes
981
0.114
0.002∗∗∗
0.237

[6]

0.161
(2.54)
Yes
No
996
0.084

0.129∗∗∗
(3.21)

0.067∗∗∗
(2.61)

[7]

0.254∗∗∗
(3.53)
Yes
No
981
0.109

0.118∗∗∗
(3.02)
− 0.017∗∗∗
(− 2.88)
0.022∗∗∗
(2.77)
0.001
(0.32)
0.001
(0.04)
0.029
(1.42)

0.073∗∗∗
(2.78)

[8]

0.134∗∗
(2.06)
Yes
Yes
996
0.108
0.000∗∗∗

0.118∗∗∗
(2.98)

0.060∗∗
(2.31)

[9]

0.186
(2.41)
Yes
Yes
981
0.129
0.002∗∗∗

0.107∗∗∗
(2.81)
− 0.010
(− 1.61)
0.027∗∗∗
(3.75)
0.002
(0.73)
0.016
(0.69)
0.016
(0.79)

0.064∗∗
(2.48)

[10]

Table 8: Robustness Test 2—Change of Event Date to Interest Pre-judgment. In this table, we provide the results of ten ordinary least
squares models in which the dependent variable is ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium.
The regressions include all deals from the 3 years before and after the pre-judgement interest ruling (8/1/2007). The coefficient of interest is
the variable After Interest * Appr. Eligible, which captures the effect in the post-event treatment group from those in our control sample.
Columns [4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for industry fixed effects using the ten SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications. We use
robust standard errors and the t-statistics are given in parentheses. We follow the following indicators of statistical significance: ∗∗∗ indicates
p < 0.01, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.05, and ∗ indicates p < 0.10.
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Table 9: Tax-Free Deals Only – Effect of Appraisal Eligibility on Bid Premiums. In this table,
we two ordinary least squares models in which the dependent variable is Ln(gross_prem),
which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium. The regression includes
tax-free deals from 1/1/2003–12/31/2016. The coefficient of interest is the variable Appr.
Eligible, which captures the effect in the post-event treatment group from those in our
control sample We use robust standard errors and the t-statistics are in parentheses. We
follow the following indicators of statistical significance: ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01, ∗∗ indicates
p < 0.05, and ∗ indicates p < 0.10.
y = ln(gross_prem)
Appr. Eligible
ln(assets)

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

0.082∗∗

0.077∗∗

0.075∗∗

0.090∗∗

0.064∗
(1.85)
−0.034∗∗∗
(−3.11)
−0.215∗∗∗
(−3.11)
0.069
(0.89)
−0.094
(−0.56)
−0.015
(−0.40)

0.305∗∗∗
(8.64)
Yes
203
0.367

0.498∗∗
(2.48)
Yes
198
0.456

(2.39)

(9.14)
−0.032∗∗∗
(−2.78)
−0.208∗∗∗
(−3.82)
0.021
(0.33)
−0.062
(−0.52)
0.008
(0.24)

0.192∗∗∗
(9.46)
No
203
0.029

0.433∗∗∗
(4.85)
No
198
0.144

ROA
Leverage
Private
Related
Op_cost
Fed_funds
GDP
UNEMP
CPI
VIX
Constant
Quarterly dummies
n
Adjusted R2
p-value that macro effects = 0

(2.45)
−0.026∗∗∗
(−3.06)
−0.225∗∗∗
(−4.32)
0.011
(0.18)
−0.064
(−0.54)
0.007
(0.20)
−0.049∗
(−1.72)
−0.030
(−1.13)
−0.021
(−1.14)
0.027∗∗
(2.30)
−0.001
(−0.62)
−0.003
(−0.68)
0.765
(1.35)
No
198
0.196
0.149

(2.56)

significant liberalization in shareholder appraisal remedies that occurred in
2007. We have found, consistent with our model’s predictions, that the credible
threat of appraisal can act as an effective “reserve price” in a target company
auction, and that the 2007 liberalization of appraisal appears to have moved
this de facto reserve price higher. Our results, which appear to be robust
and are contemporaneously corroborated consistent results from others in the
field (e.g., Boone et al., 2017), suggest that the reserve-price rationale for
appraisal actions appears to be substantial. Moreover, we although we cannot
test directly for shareholder welfare effects of the 2007 shocks our results
(when combined with the insights from our theoretical framework) are strongly
suggestive: both the nature of the appraisal statute and the insignificant effects
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on deal activity appear strongly consistent with the claim that the reforms also
enhanced target-company welfare. It is notable, therefore, that recent judicial
opinions in Delaware have acted substantially to undercut the credible threat
(and risk) of post-merger appraisal. Future work would do well to revisit the
current jurisprudential and legislative skepticism of appraisal, treating it as
representing an appraisal-winnowing shock, and inquiring whether the shock
is associated with the reversal of the effects we have illustrated above.
A

Proofs of Corollaries

∗
Corollary A.1. When φ < max {rm
, ρ}, the expected acquisition price and
all measures of expected shareholder welfare are invariant in φ.
∗
Proof. Suppose φ < max {rm
, ρ}. By construction, for any successful bid, it
∗
must be the case that b ≥ rm
, or the directors will not allow a shareholder
vote. Similarly, for any successful bid it must also be the case that b ≥ ρ, or
the shareholders would (under the weak dominance assumption) reject the bid.
Consequently, it must be the case that for all winning bids, b > φ. Conditional
on a positive vote, then, no shareholder would seek appraisal since it would
strictly reduce her expected payoff. Now consider an infinitesimal local shock
0
dφ to expected appraisal value, increasing φ to φ = (φ + dφ). Because it
remains true that b > φ0 , appraisal remains irrelevant and equilibrium bids
and approval decisions remain the same. Consequently, shareholder welfare
does not change either.
∗
Corollary A.2. When max {rm
, ρ} ≤ φ and the non-coordinated equilibrium
emerges, expected acquisition price and all measures of expected shareholder
welfare are strictly increasing in φ so long as φ ≤ r∗ . If φ > r∗ however,
expected acquisition price is strictly increasing in φ, but all measures of expected
shareholder welfare are strictly decreasing in φ.
∗
Proof. Assume φ ≥ max {rm
, ρ} and that φ < r∗ . In the uncoordinated
equilibrium, φ is the sharpest lower bound on acceptable bids, and thus
is isomorphic to a reserve price for the auction, and thus all shareholders
seek appraisal unless b ≥ φ. Only buyers with valuations exceeding φ will
enter the auction,
and thus, conditional

 on sale, the expected winning bid is
given by E max{φ, v (N −1) }|v (N ) ≥ φ , where v (N ) and v (N −1) represent the
first and second order statistics (respectively) of the population of N buyers.
Characterizing this value requires using a variety of identities in order statistics.
It is straightforward to confirm that the maximum order statistic, v (N ) , has
N
cumulative distribution F (N ) (v) = F (v) with associated density function
N −1
(N )
of f
(v) = N f (v) F (v)
. The second-highest order statistic, v (N −1)
N −1
has cumulative distribution F (N −1) (v) = N · F (v)
(1 − F (v)). Moreover,
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conditional on v (N ) = x, then the remaining (N-1) values remain conditionally
independent but bounded above by x, so that each has a conditional distribution
(v)
function of FF(x)
The distribution of v (N −1) conditional on v (N ) ≥ φ is
N .
therefore (after some simplification):


h
i
−N
F (N −1) v|v (N ) ≥ φ = F (N −1) (v) · ln(F (φ) )
(A.1)
Under the uncoordinated equilibrium, the winning bid (if there is one) is
equal to max φv (2) |v (1) ≥ φ, and thus in expectation the winning bid is (after
simplification):




−N
E max{φ, v (2) |v (1) ≥ φ} = ln F (φ)


Z v̄
(N −1)
(N −1)
× φ·F
(φ) +
vdF
(v)
(A.2)
φ

where recall that F (N −1) (v) is the unconditional cumulative distribution function on the second-highest valuation among the N bidders. The term on the
outside of the square brackets is clearly increasing in φ, and differentiating the
term inside the brackets respect to φ yields:
F (N −1) (φ) + φ · f (N −1) (φ) − φ · f (N −1) (φ) = F (N −1) (φ) > 0

(A.3)

Thus, the expected price is always strictly increasing within the uncoordinated
equilibrium. As to expected shareholder welfare, note first that in the uncoordinated equilibrium all shareholders receive the same price. Finally, note that
by construction of r∗ , shareholders’ expected payoff is strictly increasing in φ
for all φ< r∗ and strictly decreasing for all φ> r∗ (See Choi and Talley, 2017
for details).
∗
Corollary A.3. When max {rm
, ρ} ≤ φ and the coordinated equilibrium
emerges, expected acquisition price may be increasing or decreasing in φ.
When φ ≤ r∗∗ the maximin measure of expected shareholder welfare is strictly
increasing in φ if and only if expected acquisition price is also increasing; the
aggregate measure of expected shareholder welfare is weakly increasing. When
φ > r∗∗ , aggregate shareholder value is weakly decreasing in φ and maximin
shareholder value is increasing only if announcement price is also increasing.

Proof. Now consider the coordinated equilibrium which occurs only when
∗
the following condition is satisfied at winning bid b : max{rm
, ρ} < b < φ.
∗
∗
Let us first assume that rm ≤ ρ so that rm plays no role in the auction (as
ρ is a sharper bound). Within this setting, a successful bid b will pay a
“headline” price of b to a fraction α of shareholders and will pay the expected
appraisal price φ to the remaining shareholders (who vote against and seek
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appraisal). Consequently, the winning bidder will expect to pay a price of:
αb + (1 − α)φ. An incentive compatible, efficient auction can be implemented
through a revelation mechanism in which each bidder reports its type and the
highest report wins, paying a headline “announcement” price equal to b, where:


ρ
if v (2) < αρ + (1 − α)φ



1 (2)
(A.4)
b(v (2) ) =
v − (1 − α)φ if v (2) ∈ [αρ + (1 − α)φ, φ]
α

 (2)
v
if v (2) > φ
Factoring in appraisal seekers, of course, the “aggregate” price paid by the
winning bidder will be:

(2)

αρ + (1 − α)φ if v < αρ + (1 − α)φ
(2)
(2)
b̂(v ) = v
(A.5)
if v (2) ∈ [αρ + (1 − α)φ, φ]

 (2)
(2)
v
if v > φ
Thus, the expected announcement price will be given by:
φ̂

n
o Z
E b(v (2) ) =



ρdF (N −1) v|v (N ) ≥ φ̂

v
φ̂−αρ
(1−α)

Z
+
φ̂

Z
+

φ̂−αρ v̄
v
(1−α)

!


v − φ̂
+ ρ dF (N −1) v|v (N ) ≥ φ̂
α


dF (N −1) v|v (N ) ≥ φ̂ ,

where we have utilized the substitution φ̂ ≡ αρ + (1 − α)φ so that φ =

(A.6)
φ̂−αρ
(1−α) .

Note that φ̂ is strictly increasing in φ, so we can do qualitative comparative
statics on φ by doing comparative

statics on φ̂. Differentiating the above.
Substituting for F (N −1) v|v (N ) ≥ φ̂ , this expression becomes:

Z
n
o h
i
−N
(2)
(N −1)

b(v ) = ln(F (φ̂) ) · ρF
(φ̂) +
φ̂

Z

v̄
φ̂−αρ
(1−α)

!
v − φ̂
+ ρ dF (N −1) (v)
α

!
vdF (N −1) (v)

+

φ̂−αρ
(1−α)

(A.7)

Without additional assumptions, it is not possible to sign unambiguously the
derivative of the expected announcement price as a function of φ. Because the
maximin welfare of shareholders increases if and only if the announcement price

Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value

39

increases, the ambiguity follows here as well. As to aggregated shareholder
welfare, however, we know that so long as φ < r∗∗ shareholder welfare is
strictly increasing in φ, and strictly decreasing thereafter.
∗
Now suppose that rm
∈ (ρ, φ] so that the manager sets a higher reserve
∗
payoff than the pivotal shareholder. There are two relevant cases: (a) rm
∈
∗
(ρ, αρ + (1 − α) φ] and (b) rm ∈ (αρ + (1 − α) φ, φ]. In case (a), the manager’s
reserve price is still not binding, since the minimally acceptable bid under
appraisal is the winner’s total costs, which can never be lower than αρ +
(1 − α) φ under this equilibrium. Here, then, the same equilibrium as above
holds. In case (b), the manager has additional slack to achieve his reserve price
∗
and will (credibly) announce a reserve price r̂m
so that the total consideration
∗
paid achieves rm Thus, the manager will set
∗
∗
∗
rm
= αr̂m
+ (1 − α) φ ⇐⇒ r̂m
=

1 ∗
(r − (1 − α) φ)
α m

(A.8)

Here, when φ increases, the manager will simply reduce her headline reserve
price to compensate, so that the aggregate reserve price remains as a meanpreserving spread. It is easily confirmed here that aggregate shareholder
welfare does not change, but both price and maximin shareholder welfare
decrease because of the slackened announcement reserve. This establishes
that the in case (b), the aggregate measure of shareholder welfare may remain
constant even though φ < r∗∗ This establishes the Corollary.
Corollary A.4. So long as φ ≤ r∗ expected shareholder welfare is increasing
in φ if expected announcement price is also increasing in φ
Proof. Within the connected components of the coordinated and non-coordinated
equilibria, the claim in the Corollary follows directly from Corollaries 1–3 and
Figure 1. One last consideration, however, concerns what happens when a
shock to φ causes the equilibrium to “jump” from one class to the other.
Suppose first that there is a jump from the non-coordinated equilibrium
to the coordinated one as φ is increased by infinitesimal dφ, and consider
∗
the case where rm
≤ αρ + (1
price
 − α)φ
 In this case, the announcement
 
immediately falls from to E min ρ, α1 v (N −1) − (1 − α)φ
< φ < φ + dφ,
and the auction migrates from one with a de facto reserve price of φ to one
with a de facto reserve price of αρ + (1 − α)φ. Consequently, because φ ≤ r∗
we also know that expected aggregate revenue declines as well. Finally, in the
coordinated equilibrium, the have-not shareholders must be worse off than
under the status quo ante, since now they receive the lower, non-pro-rata share
of a winning bid in an auction whose de facto reserve is further away from
∗
optimal than it was initially. The case where rm
> αρ + (1 − α)φ under the
coordinated equilibrium differs only in the respect that the manager may set a
reserve higher than ρ and reduce it to with the shock to φ in order to preserve
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an α-weighted mean spread. Prices still decline, as does maximin welfare,
though aggregate shareholder welfare remains unchanged.
The identical reasoning (in reverse) applies when the shock to φ induces a
jump from the coordinated equilibrium to the non-coordinated one. So long as
φ ≤ r∗ , such a jump will result in both an upward price shock and an upward
jump in both measures of shareholder welfare. This completes the proof.
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